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I. INTRODUCTION
This is an age of accomplishment in almost every facet of our eco-
nomic and technological existence in the United States. As our society
reaches new economic levels, it becomes apparent that personal consump-
tion expenditures have been a major contributing factor. Increased con-
sumer expenditures are attributable to the addition of credit buying and
lending to the economic structure. The institutions granting credit mea-
sure their participation in this unprecedented economic boom by the
amount by which profit exceeds loss. The increased use of credit buying
and the skyrocketing interest charges practically guarantee these institu-
tions a solid share of the profit earned from the "household sector" of
the economy.
There is another type of advancement which has recently been em-
phasized-the social and humanistic advancement of the low income
sector of society. In the past, we have sacrificed our humane concern in
the search for extensive business profits which highlighted the 1950's and
early 1960's. Recently, interest has been focused on abolishing discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation. Discriminatory credit practices,
however, have increased with respect to both the low income and the
minority consumer.
This article examines the extent of this credit problem, surveys solu-
tions under existing law, and attempts to define power sources for legisla-
tive problem solving.
* Written while a senior law student at the University of Miami.
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II. THE PROBLEM
A. A Credit Economy
The "household sector" of the economy has been termed the largest
and most important of all sectors.' Total consumer expenditures (for
durables, nondurables and services) constitute two-thirds of all final buy-
ing in the economy 2 and this consumption level continues to rise each
year.3
A major factor contributing to the large volume of consumption by
the household sector is the gradual development of credit as a substitute
for cash transactions.4 Prior to 1910, credit usage was limited to lower
income groups. This pattern began to change when the automobile indus-
try began encouraging installment buying. In the 1920's, use of credit
grew rapidly as much of the stigma previously attached to it vanished.
Between 1920 and 1960, the installment debt, exclusive of mortgages,
rose from one billion to forty-two billion dollars.' In the first quarter of
1967 a total of ninety-two billion dollars in credit was outstanding.' It is
increasingly clear that credit has become an extremely potent factor in
our economy.' In addition, credit has become a significant spending factor
in the lives of consumers. Figures indicate that at the end of 1965, total
consumer debt outstanding was 16% of the annual personal income, in
contrast to 7% in 1948.8
There are two broad categories of consumer credit: installment and
non installment. Installment credit includes automobile paper, other con-
sumer goods paper, home repair and modernization loans, and personal
loans.' Non installment credit, on the other hand, includes single payment
loans, charge accounts and service credit.10 Various institutions are in-
volved in granting consumer credit and holding the consequent obligations.
Commercial banks, sales finance companies, credit unions, consumer
finance companies, and retail outlets all play a significant part in the
growth of the credit economy."
1. R. HEILBRONER, UNDERSTANDING MACROECONOMICS 60 (1965).
In 1963 it comprised over 47 million families and 11 million independent individuals
who collectively gathered in $464 billions and spent $375 billions.
Id. at 61.
2. Id. at 62.
3. Id.
4. CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT, 54 FED. RES. BULL. 457 (June 1968).
5. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 1, n.1 (1963)
6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1967, 465, table 648.
7. G. MOORE & P. KLEIN, THE QUALITY OF CONSUMER INSTALLMENT CREDIT 4 (1967).
8. J. CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: ITS COSTS AND
REGULATION 1 (1967). Consumer credit herein is defined as:
all short and intermediate term credit extended through regular business channels
to finance the purchase of commodities and services for personal consumption, or
to refinance debts incurred for such purposes. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1967, 465, table 649.
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Despite the greater use of credit in sales transactions today, certain
prerequisites must ordinarily be met before a consumer may be granted
credit. Three main factors are considered in determining the acceptability
of a candidate for credit: character, capacity, and capital."2 The moral
responsibility or the character of the candidate is determined by closely
scrutinizing his reputation in business, his living and spending habits,
and his negative tendencies, e.g., alcoholism and gambling. Capacity of
the consumer is also viewed to determine his ability to earn a livelihood.
In this regard, his record of employment, residence, legal status, and
prior record of payment are significant. The capital of the candidate is
important inasmuch as it determines his current ability to repay the loan.
Such items as income, capital assets and current obligations must be con-
sidered in reaching this determination."
In obtaining this information, credit departments follow several steps.
First, the consumer completes an application for a loan by filling in the
requested information. Then, a personal interview is conducted to examine
certain details and to pinpoint the intended use of the loan. The credit
department analyzes the information obtained to determine whether fur-
ther investigation may be worthwhile. 4 Depending upon the size of the
institution, the credit department will either conduct further investigation
itself or utilize the services of a credit bureau which will conduct the
investigation and issue a report on the application to "complete the
picture."" Finally, a determination is made as to whether or not the re-
quested credit should be granted, based upon whether the information
secured indicates that the applicant meets the standards established by
the institution.
B. Credit and the Minority Consumer
The credit standards established by the various loan and retail in-
stitutions present little or no problem for the middle income consumers.
The low income consumer, however, is most often unable to meet the
stringent criterion established' " and hence is labeled a "poor credit risk."I7
This leaves an indelible mark on the financial soul of the minority
consumer and presents him with a grave buying problem. Senator Mag-
12. R. ETrTnoER & D. GOLIEB, CREDITS AND COLLETIONS 12, 60 (1962).
13. Id. at 60.
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 96.
16. It appears that two general types of discrimination may be found to exist: That
which is based upon the race, color, religion or national origin of the credit applicant
(known as minority discrimination) and that which is based upon the low or poor economic
standing of the credit applicant (known as low income discrimination). Many times the two
are indistinguishably intermixed because of the personalized credit financing approach which
has developed in the low-income neighborhoods.
17. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 5, at 14. Caplovitz points out that the "poor credit risk"
label is the result of low income, negligible savings, job insecurity, and no permanent
resident or friends who will vouch for them.
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nuson accurately describes the motivational buying factor in pointing
out that these less fortunate persons are
constantly surrounded and reminded of all the material benefits
of our great society which are enjoyed by everyone else ....
Like us they are the recipients of the daily advertising messages
of the necessities of life which we should buy. . . .The social
pressure on them to consume is almost irresistible, not simply
because of their actual physical needs for many of these posses-
sions, but also because of their deep psychological needs for
self-respect, for dignity, for a feeling of belonging and for ap-
proval from their neighbors .... 18
David Caplovitz concurs with the existence of a psychological need for
consumption as he points out that many of these persons in the low in-
come bracket have scant hope of improving their low social standing
through occupational mobility. 9 Mr. Caplovitz believes that they must
then turn to consumption and material possessions to play their part in
the American success story.20 Consumption then is a form of "compensa-
tion ' 21 for blocked social mobility.
The problem of trying to buy goods in a society that operates on
credit was, for the poor, a difficult one. But the American free enterprise
system quickly rushed to the rescue by adapting "credit" as it was known
in the larger, bureaucratic marketplace to suit the needs of the low income
consumer. The system eventually ironed out was simple-the entrepre-
neurs, i.e., local merchants, sold goods of poor quality to impoverished
consumers at a price that was marked up to twice or three times the cost.
Added to the already high cost of the goods were equally high interest
rates based upon the greater risk of non-collection being assigned by the
entrepreneurs.
Today the system is basically unchanged with the exception of the
establishment of a "personalized" approach. Typically, the price of an
item is not predetermined, rather it is set by the merchant after taking
into consideration the type of customer and the estimated risk.22 Once
the "exploiter" has determined that the buyer is worth some credit risk,
and the price he will charge for taking that risk, he establishes a series
of controls to insure repayment.23 The fact that the poor are at the
mercy of these high priced neighborhood stores and peddlers is demon-
strated by Senator Magnuson who states:
18. W. MAGNUSON & J. COOrER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKET PLACE 33 (1968).
19. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 5, at 13.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 5, at 16.
23. Formal controls include: liens against wages and property, repossession, discounting
paper and credit association ratings. Informal controls include: expected mispayment and
consequent high markup and weekly payments to establish a close relationship.
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Shopping surveys in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago and San
Francisco reveal the same pattern; the poor are paying exor-
bitant prices, usually 75 to 100 percent more for goods from
stores in low income areas as compared with those in "ethical"
stores patronized by the middle class. 4
The low income consumer, then, with the same wants and needs as
his middle income counterpart, but lacking the credit standing, knowledge,
and mobility of his counterpart, must turn to an "easy out" with the
"friendly neighborhood store." This consumer is virtually forced to pay
higher prices and interest rates by the fact of his poverty.
There can be no doubt that most poor consumers use this "E-Z
credit" way out. In the Caplovitz survey it was determined that 75-90%
of the business of these local merchants was handled on credit.2" Further,
it was shown that 81% of the low income type consumers surveyed used
credit as a method of payment in at least some of their purchases.20
Discrimination, then, is prevalent in the marketplace against the low
income consumers as a group.
First, many of the "ethical" or bureaucratic institutions supply
forms for an applicant to fill out containing questions in regard to the
applicant's "race," "color," "creed" or "national origin." When this in-
formation is used as a basis for denial of the loan or credit application,
there can be little doubt that discrimination is taking place.
Second, many credit institutions require a personal interview, during
the course of which the interviewer casually notes "C" for colored or "B"
for black.28
Third, many institutions either flatly refuse to extend credit to
members of minority groups or they set their standards so high in
dealing with the applications of the "poor" for credit, that few, if any,
of the low income group can meet the requirements.29 The maintenance
of high credit standards, though to some extent justifiable by the need
for adequate assurances of repayment, when based upon very high
income levels, or when applied on a sliding scale depending on the credit
applicant, has a discriminatory effect upon low income groups.3 0
24. MAGNUSON, supra note 18, at 34.
25. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 5, at 16.
26. Id. at 101.
27. But see Mindlin, The Designation of Race or Color on Forms, 26 PUB. AD. REV.
110 (1966). The author argues that unless designation of race or color is allowed on forms,
there is no means of administratively policing discrimination.
28. This writer interviewed a local bank vice-president who indicated that this practice
was prevalent in the industry. April 8, 1969. Also, there is evidence in the concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) that whites can
secure larger, better loans than Negroes.
29. This writer interviewed several door to door salesmen who indicated that they
were never allowed to extend credit to minority groups. Others said that their requirements
were more stringent if the "colored" were involved. In Miami, February 26, 1969.
30. The contention could be made that the existence of credit standards, established
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The fourth type of discrimination which may be pointed out is in
fact a subcategory of discrimination against the "poor" as a group,
namely that against non-whites8 ' as to price.32 The personalized approach
of local merchants is a natural vehicle for discrimination against non-
whites. As Caplovitz points out: "neighborhood merchants do evidently
make discriminations along racial lines, the basis for which may lie in
exploitation, sales pressure, or distrust."8 " All a merchant needs to do is
talk with the buyer to be, size him up, figure the risk factor and then
set the price accordingly.84
Some discriminatory practices have been isolated. Our governmental
structures have whittled away at biases for and against different groups
in this society. Similarly, these credit problems must be confronted and
solved. If these problems are not confronted, the poor will surely become
poorer, regardless of government poverty programs. An existence without
credit in this complex society is a bleak one indeed. While this article
does not begin to assert the right of each minority societal member to
credit at all institutions, it does certainly assert that if other adequate
standards can be complied with, then certainly "race, color, religion or
national origin" should not be the disqualifying factor. Nor should a
relatively low income subject the credit buyer to price and interest dis-
crimination. Additionally, it is submitted that high prices and high
credit charges for the low income consumer are discrimination at its
worst-in actuality there is no credit at all in these instances.
III. THE SOLUTIONS UNDER PRESENT LAW
Assuming the existence of any one of the several discriminatory
practices described above, 8 and mindful of the seriousness of these
practices, the question logically raised under existing law (federal or
by primarily white concerns, in and of themselves are discriminatory. The reasoning is
similar to that used in the employment tests given by large corporations, namely that the
questions (or standards) are made to be answered by (or applied to) a basically "white"
culture. The point would need substantiation by evidence showing that black families with
low incomes by white standards have high incomes by black standards and are responsible
credit risks. Recently, it was demonstrated that I.Q. tests were biased in this cultural
respect. Intelligence: Is There A Racial Difference?, TIME, April 11, 1969, at 59. James F.
Crow is herein quoted: "[T]he environmental difference between being black and being
white could of itself account for the IQ gap."
31. It is certainly arguable in the discussions which follow under statutes and proposed
legislation sections that "race" could be construed to include the poor consumer generally,
without regard to color or origin. "Race" can be defined as "A class or kind of individuals
with common characteristics, interests, or habits." WEBSTa'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DicTioNARY 704 (7th ed. 1961).
32. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 5, at 91, 104.
33. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 5, at 93.
34. A two part series in The Miami Herald pointed out the higher price the non-white
pays for all goods and services, e.g., $825 for a $348 T.V. set. Elder, The High Cost of
Being Poor, The Miami Herald, July 19, 1970, at 1, col. 1 and July 20, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
For further discussion of discriminatory practices, see 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. §§ 3700-3765.
35. See note 25 and 26 supra and accompanying text.
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state), is whether the credit institution can be prevented from continuing
in its present discriminatory course?
A. Federal Law
After the Civil War the Congress, by means of legislative enact-
ments, established a policy of eliminating discrimination on account of
race or color. Later, by statute, discrimination on account of creed or
national origin was added. Constructional limitations, however, have
been placed on these statutes by subsequent court decisions. It is these
judicially imposed limitations which present a lingering problem in
attempting to provide relief for the economically deprived segment of
our society.
1. EARLY CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Realizing the inequities of the slavery system, which had relegated
the Negro to a status something less than human, the abolitionists, both
within and without Congress, secured the passage of the thirteenth
amendment. This 1865 Act sought to guarantee the freedom of slaves
everywhere in the United States and provided as follows:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall
exist within the United States or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation."
Both the opponents and the proponents assumed that the amendment
was to be broadly construed to extend beyond mere personal servitude
and slavery and that the Negro would be guaranteed certain rights under
the Act.37 The rights considered to be included within the amendment
were equality before the law, protection of life and person, and free
opportunity to live, work and move about."5 The language of the amend-
ment was first construed in the Slaughter House Cases,9 wherein the
Court interpreted "servitude" as "personal servitude" and determined
that servitude had a larger meaning than slavery. Several years later, the
Court in Hodges v. United States,4" determined that slavery of Negroes
was not the only concern of Congress, but that the thirteenth amendment
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
37. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MiCH. L. REV.
1323, 1324 (1952).
38. J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMFENT 142,
143 (1951).
39. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). This case involves the contention by various
butchers that a Louisiana statute which authorized only one corporation to slaughter cattle
in New Orleans had imposed an unconstitutional servitude upon their property. The Court
rejected the argument due to their construction of the thirteenth amendment as applying
only to personal servitudes.
40. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
1971]
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forbids the enslaving of any race or any individual. The courts have con-
sistently interpreted the thirteenth amendment in a strict manner, thus
denying the efforts of many persons subjected to harsh discrimination to
obtain relief." Consequently the amendment never really assumed the
prominence hoped for by proponents and feared by opponents. The
thirteenth amendment, however, does operate against acts of individuals
whether sanctioned by state legislation or not (unlike the fourteenth
amendment which has been construed as requiring state action)2
In order to present an argument under the thirteenth amendment,
a consumer would have to argue that the action by local merchants in
selling low quality merchandise to low income or minority consumers in
return for high prices and interest rates, causes the purchaser to be
drawn into a condition of forced compulsory service to the seller. Perhaps
the court could be persuaded by an explanation of the "controls"43 re-
tained by the merchant.
The argument, however, would more than likely fail due to the
rather strict construction which the thirteenth amendment has received.
There is a question as to whether any court would be willing to extend
coverage beyond race and color discrimination to religion or national
origin. The basic problem is finding the precedent necessary to construe
a long term debt commitment as a "servitude."
Almost immediately, it became obvious that the thirteenth amend-
ment was inadequate inasmuch as various Black Codes were enacted by
southern states, the effect of which was to render the Negro "socially an
outcast, industrially a serf, and legally a separate and oppressed class." 4
Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights Act of 186601 The
construction of this Act is interesting in that it is an outright grant of
certain rights to all citizens (Negroes, by definition included). The Act is
not based upon the commerce power of Congress (as are later acts
granting specific rights to the Negro),46 but rather upon the power of
Congress to legislate under section 2 of the thirteenth amendment.4 7 This
Act was used as the basis of decision in a recent case before the Supreme
41. Typically, denial of admission to public places such as inns and theatres and
attempts to segregate public conveyances have been held not to be "servitudes." Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883) ; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
42. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
43. See note 23 supra.
44. J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDNMNT 142,
143 (1951).
45. [A]II persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
46. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections
of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
47. Fairman & Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. S, 7 (1949).
[Vol. XXV
COMMENTS
Court, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.48 The case demonstrates the Court's
willingness to take cognizance of the ancient Act to obliterate private
discrimination. Since public accommodations are not specifically men-
tioned in the Act, conversion of the Act to provide the relief presently
sought would be difficult. Perhaps it could be argued that discriminatory
credit practices greatly restrict the minority owner's right to purchase
real or personal property. Even still, the "race and color" limitation of
the thirteenth amendment presents problems which do not permit applica-
tion of the Act to all low income consumers.
Again, however, opponents of the Act and some hostile courts did
not react favorably toward the new provisions. Supporters of the civil
rights of Negroes felt that a new Constitutional amendment was needed.
In 1868, the fourteenth amendment was adopted by Congress:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.49
This amendment, however, is limited to the extent that state action
has been required by courts in order to enforce its provisions. That is to
say, the "state" must be abridging privileges, or denying due process or
denying equal protection. For example, the low income plaintiff would
seek to establish that the state passed laws which discriminate between
two classes; that one group can obtain credit under these laws, while his
class cannot, and therefore that he has been denied equal protection of
the laws.
It would, concededly, be very difficult for the low income consumer
to identify laws which discriminate as to credit practices. However, he
could conceivably raise two arguments. First, that the intent of Congress
in adopting the fourteenth amendment was not to limit the protection
thereunder to acts by the state, but also to include individual acts in-
fringing the rights of all Americans. Testimony taken by the legislative
committee indicates that of 125 witnesses appearing before the commit-
tee, a vast majority pointed out private invasions of civil liberties as
most significant.5" In light of these hearings, it would seem absurd to
conclude that the legislature would deliberately limit the scope of the
amendment to state action.51
48. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). A Negro and his wife sought to buy a house in a private
development of St. Louis; they were refused on the basis that it was the company's policy
not to sell to Negroes. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 insures against discrimination in housing
but did not take effect until 1969, so the plaintiffs based their complaint upon the earlier
act.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50. L. WARsoFr, EQUALITY AND THE LAW 109, 110 (1938).
51. For a discussion of the intent of the legislature, see Gressman, supra note 36, at
1329, 1330.
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Alternatively, the plaintiff could argue that the current trend of the
courts to broadly define "state action" should be likewise applied in the
credit area. Actions of state courts or state judicial officials, 2 action by
the police to arrest a Negro for trespass at a restaurant segregated under
city ordinance," and denial of service to a Negro at a restaurant leased
from a state agency,54 have all been held to be within the meaning of
state action. This broad state action doctrine could be applied to the
credit area as follows: If a local merchant attempted repossession of
goods sold under a contract based on exorbitant prices and interest rates
and was refused entrance, any court granting him order to enter and
repossess could be held to have acted in a discriminatory manner.
In 1875, Congress passed another Civil Rights Act, the preamble of
which stated:
[W]e recognize the equality of all men before the law, and hold
that it is the duty of the government in its dealings with the
people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever
nativity, race, color, or persuasion, religious or political.5
It is clear that Congress was widening its scope of concern for the civil
rights of all men in their day-to-day existence. The Act itself provides
that:
[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement. . . . applicable alike to citizens of every race and
color .... 11
This Act was based upon the principles of the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendments.5 7 Clearly the intent was to eliminate the discrimina-
tory acts of individuals which occurred in public places. However,
attempts to use this Act as the basis for a suit against a local merchant
are hampered by the declaration of "unconstitutionality" by the court in
the Civil Rights Cases."8 This decision has never been reversed, but it
has been closely scrutinized and its current applicability questioned in
recent years.50
52. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
53. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
54. Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
55. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336.
56. Id. at 336.
57. Gressman, supra note 36, at 1335.
58. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
59. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Specifically at 782-83 of that decision,
Justice Brennan stated that the majority of courts today reject the limited interpretation
given by the Civil Rights Cases to the 1875 Act as it relates to the Fourteenth Amendment.
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2. RECENT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
The next significant civil rights legislation possibly applicable to
credit practices is the 1964 Civil Rights Act." This Act covers many
kinds of discrimination, but most significant to this discussion is Title
II, "Injunctive Relief Against Discrimination in Places of Public Accom-
modation."61 This title attacks discrimination from the dual standpoint
of interstate commerce and state action:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal en-
joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as
defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation
on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(b) Each of the following establishments which serves the
public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of
this title if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimination
or segregation by it is supported by State action:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment
which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an estab-
lishment located within a building which contains not more than
five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the
proprietor of such establishments as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises, including, but not
limited to, any such facility located on the premises of any re-
tail establishment; or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertain-
ment; and
(4) any establishment which is physically located
within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered
by this subsection, or within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself
out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.62
Congress, in passing this Act, utilized the fourteenth amendment
when the state has a part in the discrimination and utilized the interstate
commerce clause' when an individual discriminates against a person for
reasons of race, color, religion or national origin, and in so doing affects
60. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections
of titles 5, 28, & 42 U.S.C.). Other acts passed in the interim are of little consequence in
considering credit practices: Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified
in scattered sections of titles 18, 20 & 42 U.S.C.), Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315,
71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
61. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 5, 28, & 42 U.S.C.).
62. Id.
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce. The places of public accommodation in which discrimination
have been prohibited are specifically defined to include only three types
of establishments-lodging, dining and amusement. Under this limited
definition, the minority credit consumer can in no way qualify for relief
under this section. It is significant to note, however, that as pointed out
by John Lindsay in his House majority report, every form of public
accommodation whether covered by section 201 or not, is prohibited
under section 202 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act from discriminating or
segregating if a denial of services is required by state or local law.64
Therefore, if state action can be shown, the provisions of this Act will
apply to credit practices.
On April 11, 1968, Congress confronted the massive housing dis-
crimination problem by passing Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act
entitled "Fair Housing."65 Section 805 is of particular interest:
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful for any bank,
building and loan association, insurance company or other
corporation, association, firm or enterprise whose business con-
sists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate
loans, to deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person
applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing, constructing,
improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling or to discrimi-
nate against him in the fixing of the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms or conditions of such loans or other
financial assistance, because of the race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin of such person or any person associated with him
in connection with such loan or other financial assistance or the
purposes of such loan or other financial assistance, or of the
present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of
the dwelling or dwellings in relation to which such loan or other
financial assistance is to be made or given: Provided, That
nothing contained in this section shall impair the scope or effec-
tiveness of the exception contained in section 803 (b).6
It is now clearly set out that a low income consumer who wishes to
purchase a new house or make improvements on his existing house and
who finds discrimination in applying for a loan, may file a complaint
with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development as provided in
section 810.67 Not only is it possible to find affirmative relief in financing
housing under this Act, but it is also possible to make the fair conclusion
64. U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADM. NEws 2495 (1964). Sec. 202. All persons shall be entitled
to be free, at any establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such discrimination or segregation
is or purports to be required by any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule or order of a
State or any agency or political subdivision thereof.
65. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id. at 104.
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that if sufficient evidence as to discrimination in the housing area was
found by Congress, then relief for the rest of the credit area suffering a
like discrimination could soon be a reality.
Though possibilities of obtaining affirmative relief are found under
most of the federal acts cited in this section, there are only a few, clear-
cut avenues. Most of the acts require broad statutory construction on
the part of the court and reliance on weak arguments at best if relief is
is to be predicated upon them.
B. State Law
State law offers more concrete remedies for the victim of the "E-Z
credit" dealer. It still falls far short of establishing equality in each of
the United States, however, because a sizeable number of states have no
antidiscrimination laws whatsoever.
1. STATUTORY TYPES
As of 1965, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia had
passed statutes providing various remedies for persons subjected to
discriminatory treatment in the use of public accommodations."8 These
68. Caldwell lists the following state statutes in force in 1965:
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.60.230-240 (1962);
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 25-1-1 to -2-5 (1953);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.: 53-35 (1961);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, ch. 45 (1963);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-7301 to -7303 (1965);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 to -4 (Smith-Hurd, 1961), ch. 43, § 133 (1944);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-901 to -914 (1961);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 735.1.-.5 (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 137, § 50 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 11 (1964);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 5-8 (1957), ch. 272, §§ 9B, 92A (1963);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.343-.344 (1962);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09 (1947);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-211 (1962);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-101 to -102 (1954);
N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-1, -2, -4, and -5 (1963);
N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1-2 to -1-7, 18-25-1 to -25-6 (1963);
N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-8-1 to -8-7 (1963).;
N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 4-40 to -41
EXEcUTivE LAW § 15-2901,
PENAL LAW § 46-513 to -515;
N. D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-30 (1963);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901-35-36 (Page 1954);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 30.670-.680 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-24-1 to -24-6 (1956);
S. D. SESS. LAWS ch. 58 (1963);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1451-52 (1958);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.010-.170, 9.91.010 (1962);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (1958);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-83.1 to -83.2 (1963);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2901 to -2911 (1951).
Caldwell, State Public Accommodations Laws, Fundamental Liberties and Enforcement
Programs, 40 WASH. L. REV. 841, 842 n.4 (1965). See also Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 120 (1968).
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statutes were classified, for purposes of analysis, into four categories by
Wallace Caldwell.69 The first type of statute, with a relatively narrow
coverage,7" is typically very selective and limited in phraseology. They
often provide exclusions of one sort or another. The credit buyer is
frequently denied any relief under this type of statute. The second type
of statute, which has added specific new proscriptions to an older equally
specific listing, is typified by the New York statute.7' Unfortunately,
even under this extensive listing, credit transactions are not included.
The only hope of the low income consumer under this type of statute is
to demonstrate that a loan or credit institution is of the same kind as
one specifically listed. If this attempt fails, credit discrimination will
remain legally unnoticed in states with this type of statute.
The third type of statute is similar to the second but differs in the
inclusion of contemporary categories of public places and is preceded or
followed by such language as "to include, but not limited to" or "and any
other places, etc."72 This type of statute, by its own language, leaves
open many possibilities of interpretation. For example, the Washington
statute73 sets out a very general definition of the places where discrimina-
tion is unlawful. It also contains the "not limited to" language. Usually
personal services are among those places listed. Credit could possibly
qualify as a place of public accommodations in a state with this type of
statute.
The fourth type of statute is written broadly enough to cover all
establishments which offer services to the public but does not name
specific types of establishments.74 These statutes are typically designed to
cover all instances of discrimination by places offering service to the
public. Almost any credit institution can be sued under this broadly
phrased type of statute.7"
69. Caldwell, supra note 68, at 843.
70. E.g., District of Columbia, Maryland; see note 68 supra.
71. New Jersey, New Mexico, New York; see note 68 supra.
72. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Washington and Wisconsin; see note 68 supra.
73. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.91.010 (d) (1961). Any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage or amusement is hereby defined to include, but not to be limited to, any public
place, licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire or reward, or where charges are made for
admission, service, occupancy or use of any property or facilities, whether conducted for
the entertainment, housing or lodging of transient guests, or for the benefit, use or accom-
modation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, or for the sale of goods and merchandise,
or for the rendering of personal services ...
74. E.g., Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and Wyoming;
see note 68 supra.
75. An example is California where the statute reads:
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state, are entitled to the full and equal
accommodation, advantage, facilities, privileges or services in all business establish-
ments of every kind whatsoever.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (1959).
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2. STATUTORY REMEDIES
Caldwell classified the types of remedies available under the four
types of statutes into four additional groups. His first group includes
civil remedies which provide for the granting of actual damages and
exemplary damages to a limited extent.76 The second type of remedy is
the provision of fines or imprisonment as a criminal penalty. 77 A third
type of remedy provides for the alternate use of civil or criminal pro-
ceedings where instances of discrimination are discovered. 78 Finally,
Caldwell notes that an increasing number of states are following the
federal practice of establishing an administrative agency for the purposes
of education, conciliation, and, as a last resort, provision of legal ser-
vices.79
3. INTERPRETATIVE CASES
Difficulties arise in trying to generalize with respect to state court
cases because the state statutes differ so greatly. A recent Massachusetts
case, however, discusses two of the instances of discrimination pointed
out above-namely, application blanks listing race, color, religion or
national origin and personal interview notations as to the same. The
case of Local Finance Company of Rockland v. Massachusetts Commis-
sion Against Discrimination,° illustrates the broad interpretation given
the most general type of statute."' That court held that a finance company
in the business of making loans was a "place of public accommodation"
within the statute.8 2 Further, it found that notations by the interviewer
in blocks set out on the application form as to whether the applicant is
of Negro, White or Spanish ancestry, were definitely discriminatory
when used as a basis for disallowing credit applications. The court based
its decision on the "broad legislative purpose" in the statute's adoption
and cited persuasive cases in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions which
broadly interpreted similar statutes. These cases included allegations of
discrimination in rental apartments,83 dancehalls,84 a bootblack stand, 5
sale of homes,"" and a recreation park.87 In each of these cases the court
76. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (1959).
77. These states include the District of Columbia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming.
78. These states include Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin.
79. These states include Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Pennsylvania, and Washington.
80. 355 Mass. 10, 242 N.E.2d 536 (1968).
81. See section (B)(1) at p. 291 supra.
82. MAss. GEN. LAW, ch. 272, § 92A, as amended, ch. 437 (1953).
83. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v, Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 182
N.E.2d 595 (1962).
84. Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1954).
85. Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510 (1919).
86. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (1962).
87. Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
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had found the activity to come under the classification of "place of public
accommodation"; consequently, each discrimination was held unlawful.
Though judges in state courts are limited by the statutory language
of the legislature, a broad interpretation of the statutes can be utilized
in order to bring the minority consumer, who is the subject of discrimina-
tion, within the range of judicial assistance under the other three
statutory types.88
Even if judges were willing to utilize the most liberal interpretations,
it may still be concluded that in only approximately fifty percent of our
states can an aggrieved credit applicant obtain relief against the "ex-
ploiters" who seek to shackle him with unreasonable credit payments for
life. An analysis of the other fifty percent of the states (those which
have passed no antidiscrimination legislation or who have greatly restric-
ted existing legislation) indicates that most of these are southern states.
These are the states whose very belligerency prompted the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments. The prospects for enactment of workable legislation by
these states appear dim. These stubborn states need federal leadership
to guarantee the freedom which the Congress granted all minority mem-
bers after the Civil War.
IV. LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITIES
Given the fact that relatively few remedies may be had under existing
law and given the presence of extensive exploitation by local merchants
of the minority class of consumers, a mandate for legislative action is
present. There are indications that Congress is moving toward credit
legislation. The recent 1968 Civil Rights Act contains provisions which
make it illegal to discriminate in denying applications for loans in the
financing of housing." Also, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains pro-
visions which prohibit discrimination against applicants for employment.9
If this trend is to be continued, the problem becomes one of how can
Congress find the constitutional authority to enact legislation to remedy
the discrimination in credit practices. There are several possible sources
from which this power may be derived.
A. The Interstate Commerce Clause
The commerce clause is set out in article I, section 8, clause 3:
"The Congress shall have power ... To regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several states ... ,"1 The case of Gibbons v.
88. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
89. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
90. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
91. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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Ogden, 2 was one of the first cases to interpret the meaning of "commerce."
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more-it is inter-
course. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts
of nations, in all its branches. . . ." Speaking further of the scope of
this commerce power, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out:
It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested
in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are pre-
scribed in the constitution. 4
The case of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,95 defined the
scope of the power of Congress under the commerce clause:
In short, the determinative test of the exercise of power by the
Congress under the Commerce Clause is simply whether the
activity sought to be regulated is "commerce which concerns
more states than one" and has a real and substantial relation to
national interest.98
Justice Clark, in further clarification of this interstate commerce power,
stated:
Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also
includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, in-
cluding local activities in both the States of origin and destina-
tion, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon
that commerce.
With this broad interpretation of the commerce power, certainly local
activities can conceivably be encompassed by Congress in legislative
enactments when these activities "affect commerce." Congress has taken
this step in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.98 The provisions of Title
II,99 which seeks to eliminate discrimination in places of public accommo-
dation, and Title VII, °° which attempts to prevent discrimination in
employment, are particularly on point. Both of these provisions establish
a broad definition of what activities "affect commerce" and therefore fall
within the scope of the Act. In fact, the Accommodations Act specifies
that a restaurant can "affect commerce" even if it does not serve inter-
92. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
93. Id. at 83.
94. Id at 86.
95. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
96. Id. at 255.
97. Id. at 258.
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
99. Id. at 243.
100. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
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state travelers, as long as a substantial portion of the food which it serves
has moved in commerce. 101
Therefore, it appears that Congress has sought to prevent discrimina-
tion in housing, 102 in employment,08 and in private accommodations 114 in
one comprehensive act. There is strong support for an extension of the
interstate commerce power of Congress into the personal service area,
which is receiving an increasing portion of consumer business. Credit
practices could properly be policed within these "service" provisions, where
an extension of federal influence is necessary.
The legislative history of the 1964 Act indicates the dissatisfaction
of some with the slow-moving state legislation. The Congressional com-
mittee pointed out:
[I]n the last decade it has become increasingly clear that prog-
ress has been too slow and that national legislation is required
to meet a national need which becomes ever more obvious. 1 5
The committee believed that federal legislation would provide national
leadership by dealing with the most troublesome problems. The purpose
was to create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution
of other forms of discrimination. It is certainly true that the status of
credit in our economy has greatly increased since the 1963 consideration
of this legislation."' ° It is also true that certain states, approximately
twenty in number and mostly Southern, have failed to follow the federal
lead in passing legislation to curb discrimination. 07 It would seem that
federal leadership could again be asserted via the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution by amending public accommodations to include
a broader scope of services, namely credit. One congressman expressed
the additional majority view by pointing out that "In title II, the bill re-
ported by the full committee is deficient in that it guarantees equal access
to only some public accommodations, as if racial equality were somehow
divisible."'0 8 He went on to point out that the subcommittee bill provided
for coverage of all places of public accommodations and was therefore
more closely attuned to the needs of society.' °
If Congress used the interstate commerce clause as the basis of
prevention of discrimination in the credit area, a question would arise as
to whether the evidence would be sufficient to sustain this means as
101. Id. at 243.
102. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 18, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
103. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections
of Titles 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
104. Id. at 243.
105. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2393 (1964).
106. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1967, 465.
107. E.g., Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina.
108. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 210 (1964). Statement by the Honorable Robert
Kastmier.
109. Id.
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"reasonable."11 There would be little trouble in showing that retail firms
were involved in interstate commerce because they buy at least some goods
from out of state manufacturers. To the extent then that discrimination
against potential buyers exists, interstate commerce is restricted. The
participation of banks and loan companies in interstate commerce would
be a question of fact for investigation by Congressional committees. Cer-
tainly, the transfer of money must be as integral a part of interstate
commerce as the shipment of goods.
Assuming that the need and the reasonableness of the means could
be clearly demonstrated at a determinative hearing, there are strong
policy reasons to suggest the interstate commerce clause would not be the
best route for anti-discrimination legislation. It is clear from the outset that
the commerce power is very broad;"' and that Congress may exercise
this power to whatever extent it determines necessary. But legislative
history indicates that in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress
exercised significant restraint in limiting the public accommodations sec-
tion to a few narrow areas in the interest of national policy. Senator
Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, explained the
basis of the legislation:
[T]he commerce power is broad and plenary; and of course the
committee did not have any problem as to the authority of Con-
gress to implement its power under the commerce clause. The
committee's real problem was to determine how far it wished to
go within this authority, as a matter of national policy ....
[I]t appears the problem is not one of power but one of pol-
icy, . . .112
Apparently, a great burden is placed upon those who would seek to
expand the commerce power in the discriminatory credit area, inasmuch
as broadening national policy would be necessary. Additionally, the Attor-
ney General, speaking before the House Judiciary Committee, discussed
the limits set out in confining the area of governmental concern:
[T] he principle upon which title II stands is a moral one and all
forms of racial discrimination are equally objectionable. One can
argue legitimately from this moral principle to the inclusion of
all forms of business enterprise within the reach of the Constitu-
tion. The administrative proposal did not attempt to extend
Federal law so far ...we were reluctant to extend Federal
power beyond those areas where it was clearly needed to meet
existing problems."'
110. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
111. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
112. 110 Cong. Rec. 7402, 7403 (1964).
113. House Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding Civil Rights of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the US. before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 88 Cong., 1st Sess. 2655-56 (1963).
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Further, there seems to be little connection between the protection
of human rights and a constitutional provision designed to establish a
unified national economy." 4 The use of the commerce power in antidis-
crimination legislation could result in an absurd overextension of that
power.
Nevertheless, if sufficient evidence of an existing problem could be
gathered and if Congress could be convinced to ease its restrictive policy
in extending the commerce clause power, this avenue of approach may
provide a firm possibility for future legislation should other possibilities
fail.
The most recent Congressional enactments dealing with consumer
credit have, in fact, been bottomed on the interstate commerce power.
The recent Truth in Lending Law" 5 and the regulations promulgated
pursuant to this act, commonly called regulation "Z,"" 6 control computa-
tion of finance charges and require disclosure of annual interest rates.
Additionally the regulations affect open end credit plans"' and real estate
credit in those instances when the credit is advanced to an individual and
not for business purposes unless the business is agriculture."'
Title VI of the recent credit disclosure bill"' provides additional
requirements for the keeping and disclosure of records by organizations
dealing in consumer credit information. Again, the power source is related
to commerce.
Finally, Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 2° also
passed under the commerce power, has recently been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court as applied to "extortionate credit transactions." In
a case involving a "loan shark," the Court held the Congressional findings
of a connection between extortionate credit transactions and organized
crime; and a second connection between organized crime and interstate
commerce were sufficient to support federal regulation of this otherwise
intrastate activity.12 ' The Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas, concluded that
"[e]xtortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the
judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce."' 22 When the rationale
of Perez v. United States is taken in the light of the previous decisions in
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, and Katzenbach v. Mc Clung,
it seems clear that if Congress can legislate regarding interest rates and
114. Cf. Spector, The Fourteenth Amendment Power and Private Discrimination: U.S.
v. Guest, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 553 (1967).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. 1971).
116. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.2-226.8 (1969).
117. 12 C.F.R. § 226.7 (1969); and see Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,
309 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
118. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 and 226.9 (1969).
119. U.S. CODE CONO. & ADm. NEWS 1316 (1970); codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C. (Supp. 1971).
120. 18 U.S.C. ch. 42 (Supp. 1968).
121. Perez v. United States, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971).
122. Id. at 1361.
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their disclosure because of an effect on commerce, Congress can reach out
to cover the discrimination area of credit transactions.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment
The history of the thirteenth amendment does not readily lend itself
to an interpretation of "involuntary servitude" or "slavery" as inclusive
of the exploitation of a consumer in his credit dealings. The thirteenth
amendment to the Constitution abolishes not only "slavery" as it existed
at the time of the amendment's passage, but also involuntary servitude.
The thirteenth amendment was self-executing as applied to existing con-
ditions, but it also grants to Congress the power to enforce its provisions
by appropriate legislation.123 It is this second section of the thirteenth
amendment which Congress can and should utilize. The thirteenth amend-
ment is specifically adapted to prevent servitudes established by individ-
uals-there is clearly no "state action" requirement as under the four-
teenth amendment. The Civil Rights Cases 24 interpreted the thirteenth
amendment as follows:
By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery and
established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary
and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be
affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its
violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may be primary
and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere
prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but
an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude
shall not exist in any part of the United States. 25
It is arguable that this amendment should be applied in the instance
of credit discrimination because the Congress has the power by appropriate
legislation to abolish personal servitudes. Justice Harlan, dissenting in the
Civil Rights Cases,26 pointed out that the
[c] onstitutional provisions adopted in the interests of liberty, and
for the purpose of securing through national legislation, if need
be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to Amer-
ican citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the
people desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accom-
plish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by
changes in their fundamental law .... 27
This original intent of Congress, then, was to use national legislation to
prevent "involuntary servitudes" as the definition of the word changed.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2: "Congress shall have the power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." Congress has passed the Peonage Acts, 14 Stat. 546
(1867), pursuant to this authority.
124. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
125. Id. at 20.
126. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
127. Id. at 26.
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The United States Supreme Court, in the recent case of Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.," 8 seems to have breathed new life into section two of the
thirteenth amendment by holding that Congress did have the power under
this section to enact a statute to eradicate conditions that prevented
Negroes from buying and renting property because of their race or color.
The Court in discussing section two stated:
"By its own unaided force and effect," the thirteenth amend-
ment "abolished slavery, and established universal freedom."
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S. Ct. 18, 28. Whether or
not the amendment itself did any more than that-A question
not involved in this case-it is at least clear that the Enabling
Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do much
more. For that clause clothed "Congress with power to pass all
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery in the United States.' 12
Later Justice Stewart summed up the question of the authority of Congress
under section two:
Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into
effective legislation. 3 '
The Jones decision provides Congress with a clear definition of its
authority. Congress has the requisite power to define what are "badges
and incidents of slavery." The credit discrimination problem with regard
to its minority group aspects may qualify for remedial action by way of
affirmative legislation under section two of the thirteenth amendment. If
sufficient empirical data could be garnered, Congress might be convinced
to use the thirteenth amendment as a vehicle to end discrimination in
many other areas besides credit. Perhaps Congress will now discontinue
the fictions related to the use of the interstate commerce clause in matters
of discrimination. There are problems inherent in this interpretation. The
thirteenth amendment has been limited to race and color, which would
exclude poor whites from legislative relief. Congress would also have to
alter its definitions of "personal servitude" and "slavery." Nevertheless,
128. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
129. Id. at 439. Senator Trumbull is quoted by the Court in describing the broad range
of Congress under the thirteenth amendment during a discussion of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act:
I have no doubt that under this provision ...we may destroy all these discrimi-
nations in civil rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional
amendment amounts to nothing. It was for that purpose that the second clause of
that amendment was adopted, which says that Congress shall have authority, by
appropriate legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting slavery. Who is
to decide what the appropriate legislation is to be? The Congress of the United
States; and it is for Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may think
proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end
392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968), quoting from CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1865).
130. Id. at 440.
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equipped with the holding in Jones, Congress can fashion relief for minor-
ity consumers who are being discriminated against in credit dealings
because of their race or color.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
In a search for a valid Congressional power source, the fourteenth
amendment provides a possible answer to the credit discrimination prob-
lem.
Section five of the fourteenth amendment has a provision for legisla-
tion to be enacted: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of the article."'' This clause has
not been frequently used due to the requirement that Congress could only
enact legislation to counteract discriminatory state laws. In other words,
section five had the same limitation as section one of the fourteenth
amendment: it was operative only against the state and not against
private individuals. This point is emphasized in the Civil Rights Cases 3'
wherein it is pointed out that:
[T]he legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this
behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of citizens, but
corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and
proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or
enforce. . ... 1
Recently, however, several trends are discernible which will have a
definite effect upon the section five enabling provision of the fourteenth
amendment. First, there is increasing doubt as to the use of the commerce
clause as a basis for preventing discrimination. In the case of Edwards v.
United States,'13 Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, pointed out
that the rights of persons occupy a more protected position in our con-
stitutional system than the movement of cattle, steel and coal.' 35 The 1964
case, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 8' recognizes that
"Congress based the Act [1964 Civil Rights Act] on § 5 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its power to
regulate commerce under Art. 1, 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution."' 37 Again
Justice Douglas concurred and restated his reluctance to rely on the com-
merce clause to solve discrimination problems. 3 The real reason for
dissatisfaction with the commerce clause is that there should certainly be
a more firm basis upon which to rest legislative protection of human
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
133. Id. at 13.
134. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
135. Id. at 177.
136. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
137. Id. at 249.
138. Id. at 279.
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rights than a constitutional power source which was intended to establish
a unified national economy.
Second, the Warren Court, and more specifically Justice Brennan,
has held that Congress can pass legislation under section five of the
fourteenth amendment to prevent discrimination by private individuals as
well as state action in order to protect fourteenth amendment rights."3 9 In
the case of United States v. Guest,4 ° Guest and a fellow defendant were
charged with conspiring to deprive Negroes of the enjoyment of their
constitutional rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964). The defen-
dants moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis that it failed to state
an offense. The lower court dismissed the indictment. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment below. Justice Stewart held in Part II of the opinion
of the court, that state action was necessary under the statute. However,
he believed that sufficient state action existed to invoke the equal protec-
tion clause. Most significantly, though, six members of the Court'4 ' deter-
mined that section five was intended for more than corrective legislation
after the court had found the actions of a particular state violative of the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Brennan stated:
[T]here can be no doubt that the specific language of section
five empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all con-
spiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with
Fourteenth Amendment Rights.'42
Under this interpretation of section five, there is no reason why legislation
could not be passed under the positive grant of power to Congress. This
section could then become a more meaningful and vital elerhent of the
Constitution-there is really little for the legislature to do under the old
interpretation, inasmuch as once the court declared the state action in-
valid, there was no need for legislation.
Later in 1966, in the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan,'143 Justice
Brennan followed the prior decisions, saying that:
By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by
a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause ....
The Court has given Congress any authority which may have been stripped
from it in the past.
139. See Spector, The Fourteenth Amendment Congressional Power and Private Dis-
crimination: U.S. v. Guest, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 553 (1967) and Rose, An Appropriate
Constitutional Provision for Dealing with the Problems of Discrimination, 18 W. RS. L.
REV. 964 (1967).
140. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
141. Those members were Justices Brennan, Warren, Douglas, Fortas, Clark and
Black.
142. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966).
143. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
144. Id. at 650.
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Section five now authorizes Congress to make laws that it believes
are necessary to protect a right created and arising under the fourteenth
amendment. Consequently, Congress can decide whether punishment of
private conspiracies interfering with such a right are necessary for its
full protection.
A threshold problem in the credit area is the location of a right
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment upon which legislation can be
based. Perhaps denial of equal protection will afford the basis for Con-
gressional action. Alternatively, it might be pointed out that since § 202
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act'45 was passed prior to Guest and includes
a state action requirement, it might be amended to exclude such require-
ment. That section provides:
All persons shall be entitled to be free, at any establishment or
place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin, if such dis-
crimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or
any agency or political subdivision thereof.146
The elimination of the state action requirement would enable Congress
to reach the private individuals who are denying credit based upon race,
color, religion or national origin or who are invalidly discriminating as
to price and finance charges.
Congress has enacted legislation under section five of the fourteenth
amendment since the Guest decision. The majority committee report on
the 1968 Civil Rights Act states that:
H.R. 2516 (1968 Civil Rights Act) is such a statute (as indi-
cated in Guest) and would-as six Justices said was constitu-
tionally possible-cover racially motivated acts of violence which
do not involve participation or connivance of public officials. 4 7
The continuing force of the state action language of the Guest
opinions, and consequently the validity of H.R. 2516, is open to question.
In 1970, after undergoing significant personnel changes, the Court handed
down a decision which would appear to reinstate the state action require-
ment of the pre-Guest cases. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,148 Mr.
Justice Harlan, speaking for himself and four other Justices, restated the
language of Shelly v. Kramer 49 to the effect that: "action inhibited by
the first section of the fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may
be fairly said to be that of the states. . . ." The principle which appeared
145. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered
sections of Titles 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
146. Id. at 244.
147. U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 1840 (1968).
148. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
149. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
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to govern the Adickes case was the requirement of state action. In assess-
ing that requirement, Mr. Justice Harlan set forth the following criteria:
For state purposes it makes no difference of course whether the
racially discriminatory act by the private party is compelled by
a statutory provision or by a custom having the force of law-
in either case it is the state that has commanded the result by
its law. Without deciding whether less substantial involvement of
a state might satisfy the state action requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment, we conclude that the petitioner would have
shown an abridgement of her Equal Protection right, if she
proves that Kress refused her service because of a state enforced
custom of segregating the races in public restaurants.50
Justices Black and Brennan concurred in the result.
On the basis of the language in Adickes, it may be safely predicted
that the approach of the Burger Court to the state action requirement of
the fourteenth amendment will be more restrictive than the approach of
the Warren Court.
V. CONCLUSION
Society is moving slowly toward resolution of the credit discrimina-
tion problem. Under existing federal legislation there is but faint hope of
a consumer recovering against credit dealers with the exception of recovery
based upon the financing provisions of the new housing act. Some states
have enacted provisions to prevent discrimination in places of public
accommodation. Other states refuse to legislate against discrimination,
impliedly condoning its use in daily practices. Since most states demon-
strate an apathetic attitude toward anti-discrimination laws, new federal
legislation is needed to provide a remedy for the low income consumer.
The enactment of such remedial measures requires selection by Congress
of a valid power source. The utilization by Congress of the interstate com-
merce clause to prevent credit discrimination requires the creation of a
fiction in the law which seemingly distorts the real purpose of the com-
merce clause. The thirteenth amendment could be used as an effective
power source; however, the application of the thirteenth amendment has
been traditionally limited to situations involving discrimination based on
9race or color." The most logical power source appears to be section 5
of the fourteenth amendment, as interpreted by United States v. Guest.
Even in light of the limitations imposed upon the Guest decision by the
Adickes case, it is the opinion of this author that the Guest view is the
better view and that it should prevail. By following the Guest rationale
Congress would be clearly providing appropriate legislation to secure the
privileges and immunities of all citizens and to insure due process and
equal protection. More importantly, the court would, within constitutional
150. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970).
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bounds, be preventing discrimination by the individual merchant-a
person heretofore unaffected in his credit practices by discrimination
legislation.
Whether the interstate commerce clause will be replaced as a
federal power source will largely be determined by the interpretation
placed on the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment by
the Burger Court. Irrespective of which power source is chosen, the need
for federal leadership in solving the often neglected problem of credit
discrimination is evident. Through such leadership, the Congress can
hopefully produce an unprecedented sociological boon to match our high
level of economic and technological competence.
